By | November 30, 2013

SIEM stands for “Security Information and Event Management” and it is a well known OSS system in the security world. It is not much visible to other domains because it has been used mainly for internal purposes.

Today, I am going to talk about what SIEM is, and elaborate on possible uses of it.

Every system, servers (VM, Hypervisor, Physical), routers, switches, access points, firewalls, IPSs produce logs. These logs can be huge. To process all these logs we should talk in big data terms but this is not todays’ topic. So lets’ decrease the scope: To the access logs level.

The access logs on a system (Login/Logout requests, Password change requests, FW dropped access) should be collected for security purposes. Who connected where?, who took exception in the login process, who sweeps the IP addresses in the network? who was dropped on the Firewall/IPS? (The “who” portion can be the real identity of the user (via integration with AD/LDAP).)

The SIEM system’s, first goal is the store these logs in the most effective way. Since the log data can be high in terms of volume and velocity,the archiving system should be a specialized one and utilize fast disks and/or in-memory databases.

After the log collection, the SIEM’s second goal can be achieved: Log correlation.

In the Log correlation phase, SIEM system will correlate the logs from multiple sources to combine under a single incident. The correlation can be rule based or topology based. SIEM system for example take a connect event and look for the destination IP address in the blacklist (C&C Control center db etc) database. If there is any match, an alarm will be created in the system that can be forwarded to TT or FM systems. Or it can directly generate an alarm in the case of a login failure to a critical system. These are good candidates for rule based correlation.

A topology based example could be: If 3 login failed alarms are received from the same system then assign a score to this server. If the same system had a Firewall block in the same day, enrich the score. If more than 2 of the servers in a specific server farm have decreased to low scores than generate an alarm. This is a simple example for a statefull pattern that can be identified by SIEM.

(By the way, some operators do not have the desire to generate security related alarms. The main driver for a SIEM could also be reducing the logs to a human manageble level for further review by the security staff.)

Alternatives are limitless but managing and maintaining this mechanism could be a burden for the security department.

I see 2 problems with SIEM investments: First one is the maintenance. Security personnel are not generally familiar with the OSS and their integrations. They can provide the rules but will not be able to (or have time to) implement those on the SIEM.
So, they will rely on the OSS department (if any) which will not know anything about security. The miscommunication may lead to problems and under utilization of the investment. A solution to this problem could be outsourcing of implementation to the vendor. The vendor solutions are generally “empty” in terms of pre-defined rules so each rule should be built from scratch. The cost for the implementation could grow dramatically.

Second problem is overlapping of functions. For example, your goal is to be notified when a system tries to connect to a well-known bot center. This requirement can be achieved by SIEM but also with other “cheaper” security components. Or if you have an SQM, why not consider using it if your topology based correlation requirements are less?

When investing on a SIEM you should elaborate if you would be able to fully utilize the system, as this OSS component is generally a not cheap one.